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Abstract: This paper aims to characterize Wittgenstein?s view of knowledge. For this purpose, I 
will contrast his view of knowledge with that of traditional philosophers. Especially he shows that 
our beliefs are justiﬁed not within our minds but within our language games. I show how Wittgen-
stein translated the problem of epistemology into the problem of language, such as the grammatical 
connection between the words ?know? and ?doubt? and the grammatical difference between the 
words ?knowledge? and ?certainty.?
Introduction
?Wittgenstein is known as the philosopher engaged in the problem of language and logic. But he 
had struggled with the problem of knowledge and certainty especially for his last one and a half 
years. This paper aims to characterize Wittgenstein?s view of knowledge in contrast to that of tradi-
tional philosophy. Initially, I will provide a summary of the contrast of both views in four theses.
??Knowledge according to traditional philosophy
(1) Knowledge?certainty (indubitable).
(2) The exemplar of knowledge is the one about my own mental state.
(3) My belief is justiﬁed within my mind.
(4) The truth value of ?I know p? is invariable.
??Knowledge according to Wittgenstein
(1)? Knowledge ? Certainty 
(2)? My own mental state is not an object of knowledge
(3)? My belief is justiﬁed not within my mind but within our language games.
(4 )? The truth value of ?I know p? depends on the language game.
?I will explain each thesis below. In the next section, I will brieﬂy show how traditional philoso-
phers have dealt with knowledge.
1. Knowledge according to traditional philosophy
(1) Knowledge = certainty (indubitable).
?According to Cartesian Skepticism (Cf. Descartes (1641)), we must doubt all of our ordinary be-
liefs in order to determine their accuracy. If we ﬁnd something that cannot be doubted, we must 
know it with certainty, and it can thus become the basis of our ordinary beliefs. In this sense, 
knowledge must be certain (indubitable). Certain knowledge is the foundation of our belief system 
and justiﬁes our ordinary beliefs (what is called ?foundationalism?).
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(2) The exemplar of knowledge is that of my own mental state.
?I cannot make a mistake about my own mental state (e.g., ?I am in pain?). However, I can make 
a mistake about the outer world (e.g., ?That is a cat?). Therefore, my beliefs about my own mental 
state are more certain (indubitable) than those about the outer world. Because of this contrast, we 
must mirror the outer world in our minds as accurately as possible in order to know certainly a state 
of the world. (Rorty (1979) called such mind models ?The Mirror of Nature.?)
(3) My belief is justified within my mind.
?Descartes employed the well-known criterion clara et distincta (?clear and distinct?) in order to 
judge what belief is true. According to this criterion, only those things that I can perceive clearly 
and distinctly are known to be true. Of course, this veriﬁcation is done within my mind.
(4) The truth value of “I know p” is invariable.
?Generally, the truth value of a sentence (e.g., ?Tokyo is the capital of Japan?) changes only when 
the way world is changes (e.g., when the capital of Japan is changed). If such a change does not 
take place, the truth value of the sentence is invariable. Therefore, as long as the facts about my 
cognitive state (this is the one of the way the world is) do not change, the truth value of ?I know p? 
is invariable. (This idea is called the ?invariantism of knowledge? by Unger (1984).)
?We will see below why and how Wittgenstein denied the four theses of knowledge above. Initial-
ly, I will simply clarify his (1)? thesis ((1)? Knowledge?Certainty).
?Wittgenstein discriminates certainty from knowledge, as against traditional philosophers. The 
distinction is as follows:
?Knowledge is a result of the elimination of error possibilities.
?Certainty is equal to the absence of error possibilities.
?In the following discussion, I want to clarify the meaning of this discrimination.
2 . Do I know that I am in pain?
?Wittgenstein holds that the proposition ?I know that I am in pain? is not true but senseless (nei-
ther true nor false). He writes as follows in his later work, Philosophical Investigations (PI):
In what sense are my sensations private??Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; 
another person can only surmise it. ?In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we 
are using the word ?to know? as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other 
people very often know when I am in pain. (PI 246)
?Philosophers committed to Cartesian Skepticism insist that I can know that I am in pain, but I 
cannot know that another person is in pain. However, Wittgenstein insists that I cannot know I am 
in pain, but I can know that he is in pain. That is, 
21
What is Wittgenstein?s View of Knowledge?: An Analysis of the Context Dependency of Knowledge ?YAMADA?
(2)? My own mental state is not an object of knowledge
?Why is this? Perhaps one of the roots of this idea can be found in his early thought of meaningful 
condition of propositions in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In this work, he holds that a proposi-
tion must be able to be not only true but also false in order to have sense. Thus, the tautology (e.g., 
A?A) as well as the contradiction (e.g., A??A) have no sense (sinnlos).
The proposition shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing.
The tautology has no truth-conditions, for it is unconditionally true; and the contradiction is on 
no condition true. Tautology and contradiction are without sense (sinnlos). (TLP 4.461)
?Now let us consider whether ?I know that I am in pain? can be false. This proposition cannot be 
false. Not because it is a clear and distinct fact for me that I am in pain but because I cannot under-
stand the meaning of the words ?the pain that I don?t know.? If someone were to say, ?I don?t 
know whether I am in pain,? we could not understand him and would think that he is using the 
word ?pain? or ?know? in a different way from our normal use. This is because the words ?I know 
p? are used in situations where
?there are possibilities of making a mistake in believing p and
?I can eliminate these error possibilities.
?In case of my pain, there is no possibility of making a mistake about my pain. So, Wittgenstein 
thinks ?I know that I am in pain? to be senseless.
3 . Is my belief justified within my mind?
?The previous section has shown the grammatical connection between the concept of knowledge 
and error possibilities. In this section, we consider how error possibilities become relevant to us.
?I will begin with the following ordinary fact: frequently, the words ?I know p? are used in situa-
tions where someone doubts p.
?Let us say that someone said to me, ?I am not sure if that is a cat.? In response to this, I must 
prove that is a cat. But how to prove this depends on the context. This is because ?the doubt that p? 
has a different meaning according to context and its difference reﬂects the negative possibilities of 
p implied by the doubt.
?We can think of some cases where she doubts P1 (P1: that is a cat). In Case 1, she may think that 
it is (not a cat but) a dog (P2). In Case 2, she may think it is (not a cat but) a stuffed toy (P3). In 
both Case 1 and Case 2, the question is the same, whether P1 or not. But the negative possibilities 
of P1 are different (P2?P3).
?From this distinction, we see the way to show that I know P1 is different. In Case 1, I have to 
provide evidence that it is not a dog, e.g., its size, shape, call, etc. (R2). With such evidence, I can 
say, e.g., ?It has such a round face, so it can?t be a dog.? In Case 2, I have to provide evidence that 
it is not a stuffed toy, e.g., its motions, reactions, expression, etc. (R3). Using these, I can say 
?When I poked it, it moved. So, it can?t be a stuffed toy.?
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?The evidence in Case 1 does not justify my belief of P1 in Case 2, and vice versa.
??It has such a round face. So it can?t be a stuffed toy.
??When I poked it, it moved. So it can?t be a dog.
?Therefore, justiﬁcation rules vary with contexts. I will call this view ?contextualism of justiﬁca-
tion? (cf. Cohen (1988), Lewis (1996), DeRose (2002); they are called ?epistemological contextu-
alism? or ?conversational contextualism?). Wittgenstein would call these ?contexts? not ?conver-
sational contexts? but ?language games.? He would say that different language games are played in 
Case 1 and Case 2 and that different justiﬁcation rules (R2 and R3) are adopted to prove the same 
P1. We can rephrase the above consideration as thesis (3)?, which contradicts thesis (3) of tradition-
al philosophers.
(3)? My belief is justiﬁed not within my mind but within our language games
?This thesis implies ?I know that p? does not signify my mental state but my epistemic status giv-
en in language games, which determine what is required to justify that p. But what does it mean that 
language games are ?different?? And what determines which games we are engaged in? In the next 
section, I want to answer these questions using the idea of ?hinge propositions.?
4 . Is the truth value of “I know that p” invariable?
?Wittgenstein intensively considered problems of knowledge and certainty in his last work (On 
Certainty). He states:
If I make an experiment, I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have 
plenty of doubts, but not that. (OC 337)
?In a chemical experiment, we can raise questions about various facts such as the existence of 
CO2 in a gas. The rule of its justiﬁcation is, e.g., observing that the calcic water turns white when 
the gas enters it (hereinafter called ?Rule E?). We can play this Experiment Game (hereinafter 
called ?Game E?) as long as there are apparatuses such as a beaker with calcic water, a plastic bag 
with gas, and so on.
?Certainly, I can doubt there are apparatuses (PA) in an anomalistic situation such as one wherein 
I am seeing a hologram made by a shining laser. In such a situation, I can doubt the existence of 
these apparatuses; this doubt implies the negative possibility that they are (not apparatuses but) ho-
lograms (not PA). Thus, there are error possibilities, and the sentence ?I know that there are appara-
tuses (PA)? is meaningful in this context.
?However, in an ordinary situation, I do not in fact doubt that there are apparatuses. Furthermore, 
I cannot continue to play Game E if I doubt that there are apparatuses. Wittgenstein expresses a role 
of this proposition by the metaphor of a ?hinge.?
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some proposi-
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tions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. (OC 341)
?Among students of Wittgenstein?s philosophy, such propositions (as PA) are commonly called 
?hinge propositions.? We can restate this point as the necessary condition of the rules of language 
games below.
? If the hinge propositions of the game are not true, the justiﬁcation rules of the game cease to be 
in effect.
?In the above case, if Game E?s hinge proposition, ?there are apparatuses,? is not true, ?we ob-
serve that the calcic water turns white when the gas is entered in it? also cannot be true; therefore, 
Game E?s justiﬁcation rule (Rule E) cannot be in effect.
?Of course, it is possible to doubt the hinge proposition, as in the previous context, but then that 
game (hereinafter called ?Game H?) is designed to conﬁrm whether there are apparatuses or not 
(not hologram), a different game from Game E (Fig. 1).
?So, when I have a good evidence for whether there is CO2 in the gas in Game E, in Game H, I do 
not know that, even though I have the same evidence as that in Game E. That is to say, the truth 
value of ?I know that there is CO2 in the gas? varies depending on which language game I am play-
ing. That is,
(4)? The truth value of ?I know p? depends on the language game
?A similar relation holds in the case of the previous section. In Case 1?s justiﬁcation rule, observ-
ing the shape of the object can justify ?that is a cat,? only if that object is not a stuffed toy but a liv-
ing being (I will refer to the game that adopts Case 1?s rule as ?Game 1?). Epistemic activities in 
Game 1 are possible, as long as it is not doubted whether the object is a living being and ?the object 
is a living being? is a hinge proposition in Game 1 (?as it were like hinges on which those turn?).
?If some concrete reason to doubt this proposition arises, Case 1?s justiﬁcation rule cannot be 
used, and Game 2, which adopts justiﬁcation rule 2 (conﬁrming whether the object moves when it 
is poked), begins (Fig. 2).
?In this aspect, hinge propositions deﬁne the limit of the game. In other words, 
? ?which propositions are hinge propositions (what propositions are exempt from doubt) deter-
(Fig. 1 )
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mines the direction of research in the language game (what should be doubted in that research 
game) and
? ?the direction of research determines what justiﬁcation rule we should adopt (?justiﬁcation con-
textualism? in the previous section).
?Wittgenstein expresses his attitude toward hinge propositions (?) by the words ?sureness? (Si-
cherheit) or ?certainty? (Gewissheit) (not ?knowledge? (Wissenshaft)). Here remember Thesis (1)?, 
which discriminates certainty from knowledge, as follows:
?Knowledge is a result of the elimination of error possibilities.
?Certainty is equal to the absence of error possibilities.
?In our examples, I am sure that there are apparatuses or that that is a living being, without being 
justiﬁed in believing so. This state is different from knowledge, which means I can eliminate error 
possibilities using justiﬁcation rules (? ). Rather, it makes the game such that there are no error 
possibilities about each hinge proposition within the game.
5 . Do I know that there is a hand here?
?On the basis of the previous discrimination, Wittgenstein attempts to deal with the problem of 
skepticism. He writes as follows, in response to Moore, who raised his hand and said, ?I know that 
there is a hand here,? as an argument against skepticism.
It?s not a matter of Moore?s knowing that there?s a hand there, but rather that we should not 
understand him if he were to say ?Of course I may have erred about this.? We should ask 
?What is it like to make such an error as that???e.g., what?s it like to discover that it was an 
error? (OC 32)
?Some of the reasons why the sentence ?I know that there is a hand here? is senseless are the 
same as those for ?I know that I am in pain? in section 2. In short, there are no error possibilities to 
be eliminated, for I cannot understand making a mistake in determining that there is a hand. But 
there is the different point between the pain case and the hand case.
?In the pain case, I cannot make a mistake about the existence of my pain, because of the grammar 
of the word ?pain,? but in the case of the hand, I can make a mistake about the existence of my 
(Fig. 2 )
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hand in some anomalistic situation.
?Suppose that I was injured in a severe accident, and I awake after surgery under anesthetic. In 
this situation, I can doubt whether my hand is there, and there is a possibility of mistaking the exis-
tence of my hand. Thus, I can say, ?I know that there is a hand here? by observing my hand or by 
hearing someone?s testimony. In this context, ?I know that there is a hand here? is meaningful.
?But the important point is that this case is not the normal case but an abnormal case.
One may be wrong even about ?there being a hand here.? Only in particular circumstances is 
it impossible.??Even in a calculation one can be wrong??only in certain circumstances 
one can?t.?OC 25?
If, however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, then it would contain the expres-
sion ?in normal circumstances.? And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely 
describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones. (OC 27)
?Thus, I can summarize the difference between the case of pain and the case of the hand as fol-
lows. In the case of pain, ?I know that I am in pain? is senseless in all situations. In the case of 
one?s hand, ?I know that there is a hand here? is senseless in normal situations, but it has sense in 
abnormal situations.
?But what is it like to be ?normal?? It is very difﬁcult to deﬁne it in words. However, we can say 
that our ordinary life is formed by not doubting the existence of our hands. It is our normal form of 
life (Lebensform). This point shows the difference between the case of the hand and the case of the 
cat (or the experiment case).
?We can doubt the hinge proposition in the case of the cat, ?that is a living being,? in normal situ-
ations because we have our ordinary practices of conﬁrming whether such a thing is a living being 
or not. Thus, we can give expressions of doubt and knowledge an ordinary meaning.
?But confirming whether our hands exist is not our ordinary practice. We can provide neither 
doubting nor the knowing of their existence with an ordinary meaning. Moreover, Game 2, where 
the hinge propositions of Game 1 (?that is a living being?) is doubted, and Game H, where the 
hinge propositions of Game E (?there are apparatuses?) are doubted, are possible without the doubt 
of the existence of our own hands. If this were not a hand, I could not poke the object or touch the 
beaker. In this sense, the proposition ?there is a hand here? plays a role as a hinge in almost all of 
(Fig. 3 )
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our ordinary language games in which we judge what belief is true (Fig. 3).
Conclusion
?Most of the above discussion depends on the ordinary meaning of our language. This argument 
does not refute skepticism; in short, it does not show that we cannot give skeptical doubt some phil-
osophical meaning which is different from ordinary meaning (see chapter 2 of Yamada (2009)).
?However, it reminds us of where the word ?know? comes originally from. We may say Wittgen-
stein translated the problem of epistemology into the problem of language, such as the grammatical 
connection between the words ?know? and ?doubt? and the grammatical difference between the 
words ?knowledge? and ?certainty.?
?If we express this difference using early Wittgenstein?s distinction between ?can be said? and 
?can be shown,? we could say that knowledge can be said within language games, and certainty can 
be shown without words by our research practices.
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